Today, most Russians are beginning to think in a way that has almost nothing to do with reality. They tend to view the world as full of confrontation, hostility, rivalry and potential conflicts. This ideology of conflict is a major characteristic of the Russian political culture.
In their statements and policies, the majority of contemporary Russian politicians mention certain external and internal forces that they view as threats to the country and as obstacles to its progress. These forces, however, have no names and no addresses. Though oblique references to the US can sometimes be discerned in some speeches and media reports, no one specifies exactly who these enemies or opponents are, confining themselves instead to making general statements. They hint that Russia's failure to succeed is due to its foreign enemies, or some unnamed, internal destructive forces.
The government has recently been debating a proposal to ban references to a criminal's nationality in media reports about his crimes, which actually means the fewer details, the better. We do not want to understand the roots of a problem. All we want is to emphasize that certain problems do exist in Russian politics and that they have been implanted in the Russian community by hostile forces to prevent Russian politicians from doing their job. This is sad, I think, because confrontational thinking at the grassroots level leads to conflicts between ethnic groups. Meanwhile, a lot of the nation's problems, including xenophobia, could be solved if the government were more transparent and receptive to criticism.
The events in Kondopoga (North-West Russia) were not just the result of an escalation of hostility toward local Chechens and other immigrants from the Caucasus and Central Asia; they were more likely caused by the fact that some local Russians were aware of the impotence of the local government and the police to protect them from criminal groups. Although the law enforcement system is evolving in Russia, its fundamental way of thinking is not. At the same time, it is becoming increasingly corrupt and detached from society. This provokes desperate measures on the part of ordinary people, some of which transform into inter-ethnic clashes.
The idea that migrants from the Caucasus, Central Asia, Moldova and Ukraine account for a significant part of the nation's economy and that today they work for less money in sectors where Russians themselves do not want to work is rarely made clear to the community. More often broadcast are stories about criminal activity among guest workers, while the press prefers to write about how much money they send to their families back home. This disinformation, or at least selective reporting, distorts Russians' perceptions of these issues.
Little information can be obtained about developments in the majority of Caucasian republics, especially Azerbaijan and Armenia. This is perhaps mostly due to the fact that these countries have been developing dynamically and that no bad news is coming out of Karabakh, so there are few sensational items to report. Georgia, though, remains in the media spotlight, which is wrong. An emphasis on disputes makes one believe that the entire region is mired in conflict. The escalation of tension makes the majority of Russians believe that the Caucasus is a zone of perpetual wars that have forced Caucasians to flee to Russia. The notion that these migrants are all refugees does not cast them in a very favourable light and provokes hostility and tension on both sides. Today, Russia fails to see the consequences its policy may have. Russians constitute the bulk of the population of Abkhazia, though how they obtained Russian passports remains unknown. I think if a war breaks out between Georgia and Abkhazia, residents of central Russia will not be happy to receive a million Russians from the self-proclaimed republic carrying Russian passports, nor would the latter be treated like compatriots. There is a dangerous gap between political moves and the views of ordinary people.
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